Tuesday, November 11, 2008

The wrong approach toward EULEX

The wrong approach toward EULEX


(Zeri, 10 November 2008,
by Burim Ramadani)



· EULEX Kosovo must be clarified and deployed as soon as possible. At the same time the functions, competences, deployment and political mandate of this technical mission for post-independence Kosovo must be defined with no dilemma on the legal basis.

· The idea that EULEX is only a technical mission certainly made sense ten months ago - at the time when the mandate of the mission was set. In reality EULEX will not be just like that. The political problems and dilemmas that are appearing lately between the UN and the EU are an indication of a strong political symbolic [impact] that the European mission will have, thus indicating the importance of various organizations in the area of the international law and international relations. In the meanwhile, General De Kermabon should not worry at all about this part of the story - he should be more focused on the full-capacity functioning of the mission.

· The decision to send EULEX to Kosovo, is above all a political decision, therefore this mission is politically important. If certain countries inside the EU still hesitate to recognize independence of Kosovo, then it would be wise, if these countries were not part of EULEX at all. It would not be much evident if Spain, Slovakia, and Rumania were not part of the mission. Moreover, Romania has not yet resolved its relations with Kosovo and its people after the violence and the murder of two Kosovo citizens on 10 February 2007.

· But EULEX comes to independent Kosovo, which has its constitution and no responsibility to the UN Resolution 1244/99 of the UN Security Council. The sooner the certain countries of the EU and UN realize that there will be no more missions like UNMIK in Kosovo, the more progress will be reached in EULEX’s deployment and the efficiency of the international community in Kosovo to ensure the rule of law, to fight against the organized crime, and protect minorities.

· The delays in full deployment of EULEX in Kosovo have caused loses in terms of time as well as political and practical aspect. But the approach of the UN and the EU during these months was and is wrong in principle. How can EULEX’s deployment be discussed with Belgrade? In fact, what can be discussed this Serbia about this issue and what would be the result? How can Pristina talk to Belgrade about the territory and developments inside Kosovo? In fact, this was a failed effort since the beginning and as such it is completely wrong. It is understandable that in each case there are the ideas and projects that aim at destroying something that has been achieved or to change reached achievements. In this context one should understand the efforts of certain circles in Brussels for an agreement with Belgrade. But the main approach of these important, sensitive and difficult developments is, what comes from Pristina.

· Kosovo institutions are the ones that make big decisions about Kosovo. This is the response that should be given by all local institutions, responsible for the democratization of Kosovo’s state and people. No agreement between the EU and Serbia has taken the consent of Kosovo institutions and this should serve as a self-explanatory reaction to any illogical initiative that might come from different international policy-making levels. Half-confirmed news about an agreement with Serbia on EULEX’s deployment is an indication that the wrong approach is continuing. EULEX cannot operate as neutral, because this would not contribute either to the internal integration of Kosovo or the improvement of neighboring relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

· Kosovo institutions are the only address where the internal developments can be discussed. After all, the future and the perspective of the people of Kosovo have nothing to do with Belgrade’s will. Therefore, EULEX should look only toward Kosovo – it has nothing to do with Serbia.

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